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abstract




The term ‘Sobel sequence’ is used in literature for a sequence  like the following:​[1]​

(1a) If the USA threw its weapons into the sea tomorrow, there would be war; 
(1b) but if the USA and the other superpowers all threw their weapons into the sea tomorrow, there would be peace… (Lewis 1973, 10).​[2]​

For conditionals, a Sobel sequence can be generally characterised as exhibiting the following schema (p1,..., q standing for sentences connected by if-then):

If p1, q.
If p1 and p2, not-q.
If p1 and p2 and p3, q...

Numbering the conditionals in the sequence (1,..i,...n), consider i and i+1. The antecedent of conditional i+1 strengthens the antecedent of i by forming a conjunction with a further antecedent sentence pi+1, while the consequent of conditional i+1 entails the denial of the consequent of i. 
For descriptions, a Sobel sequence can be generally characterised as exhibiting the following schema (F1,,.. G standing for predicates):

The F1 are G.
The F1-and-F2 are not-G.
The F1-and-F2-and-F3 are G...
 
Numbering the sentences in the sequence (1,...i,...n), consider i and i+1. The noun phrase (NP) in subject position of sentence i is strengthend in i+1 by adding a further predicate Fi+1 and the predicate of i+1 entails the denial of the predicate of i. There are also singular sequences. In line with the literature, I shall concentrate on sequences of two sentences (i, i+1).
The sequence (1a)-(1b) may well be truly and felicitously uttered in many contexts. The same goes for many other instances of Sobel sequences.​[3]​ There is a striking asymmetry to a sequence where the strengthened antecedent comes first (cf. von Fintel 2001):

(1b) If the USA and the other superpowers threw their weapons into the sea, there would be peace; 
(1a) #but if the USA threw its weapons into the sea, there would be war.

In many contexts where the normal sequence is felicitous, its reversal is not.​[4]​
The problem spreads to indicative conditionals (cf. Williams 2008). The following sequence is perfectly in order in many contexts: 

(2a) If the USA throws its weapons into the sea, there will be war; 
(2b) but if the USA and the other superpowers throw their weapons into the sea, there will be peace.

But the reverse sequence sounds odd:

(2b) If the USA and the other superpowers throw their weapons into the sea, there will be peace; 
(2a) # but if the USA throws its weapons into the sea, there will be war.

The problem is not limited to conditionals. It spreads to incomplete descriptions (cf. Schlenker 2004, 427).

A farmer has sent her servant to look for her (only) pig. There is also a neighbour’s pig around which is marked by its floppy ears. 


(3a) The pig is grunting; 
(3b) but the pig with floppy ears is not grunting.

(3b) The pig with floppy ears is not grunting; 
(3a) #but the pig is grunting.

We get the same result for plural descriptions (cf. Schlenker 2004, 419):​[5]​

(4a) The pigs are grunting; 
(4b) but the pigs with floppy ears are not grunting.

(4b) The pigs with floppy ears are not grunting; 
(4a) #but the pigs are grunting.

The asymmetry arises only when (4a) and (4b) are used as incomplete descriptions, not covering all pigs and pigs with floppy ears whatsoever, respectively. Otherwise both the normal sequence and its reversal are inconsistent. In my view, the asymmetry can be spotted even in some complete descriptions (though I have encountered diverging intuitions):

(5a) The closest gas stations are crummy; 
(5b) but the closest Shell stations are great.​[6]​

(5b) The closest Shell stations are great;
(5a) ?but the closest gas stations are crummy.​[7]​

I have encountered general doubts about the outright distinction of felicity and infelicity, and more particular doubts about the purported infelicity of (5b)-(5a). The outright distinction might be replaced by some gradual or comparative notion. For instance, it better captures our linguistic intuitions to say that (1b)–(1a) and (5b)-(5a) appear somewhat odd but (3b)–(3a) is unbearable. But without doubt, there is some asymmetry between a normal sequence and its reversal, even in the case of (5b)-(5a). The normal sequence sounds better. My main aim is a unified explanation of these bedrock data. 
So far there is no unified explanation of all the data. There are only partial explanations concerning counterfactuals, indicative conditionals, and descriptions respectively. There are two rival explanations for counterfactuals, a dynamic strict conditional analysis (von Fintel 2001, Gillies 2007) and a pragmatic solution within the standard analysis of counterfactuals as variably strict conditionals (Moss 2011). There is an explanation in terms of a strict conditional analysis of indicative conditionals (Williams 2008). And there is an anaphoric explanation for descriptions (Holst 2013). None of these analyses covers all the data, and so far it is not clear whether the partial explanations are compatible with each other. I shall discuss the potential of the individual proposals both for providing a partial and a unified explanation. Then I shall develop a unified explanation in terms of presuppositional anaphora, which draws on amendments of Holst’s anaphoric approach to descriptions. I shall present two lines of explanation. The first one starts from conditionals and proceeds to descriptions. I point out difficulties for the extant approaches following this line. The second line starts from descriptions and proceeds to conditionals. I argue for an account along this line. One main result that should be of general interest to philosophers working on Sobel sequences is that reverse Sobel sequences are compatible with many approaches to conditionals, including the simplified Stalnaker-Lewis orthodoxy.


2 Starting from Conditionals
2.1 Strict Conditional Semantics

In discussing the dynamic strict conditional approach to counterfactuals, I shall disregard the subtleties of the different versions (von Fintel 2001, Gillies 2007). A counterfactual p>q is true if q throughout the p-worlds in a contextually determined modal horizon, which can be characterised as follows: worlds form a total preorder according to their closeness to the evaluation world.The order is complete: for any two worlds, either they are equally close or one is closer to the evaluation world. It is transitive: for any three worlds w1, w2, w3, if w1 is closer than w2 and w2 is closer than w3, w1 is closer than w3. And it is reflexive: for any world w, it is at least as close as w. The modal horizon comprises all the worlds which are at least as close as some outermost world. In the approach under discussion, it is determined as follows: consider an utterance of

(1a) If the USA threw its weapons into the sea tomorrow, there would be war; 
(1b) but if the USA and the other superpowers all threw their weapons into the sea tomorrow, there would be peace.

Counterfactuals are highly sensitive to conversational context. Lewis reminds of the following classical example (Lewis 1973, 66-67): in a discussion on Caesar’s character, we may accept as true ‘If Caesar had been in command in Korea, he would have used the atom bomb’. In a discussion of Caesar’s techniques of warfare, we may accept as true ‘If Caesar had been in command in Korea, he would have used catapults.’ Lewis proposes that the closeness ordering is determined by an ordering of worlds according to their overall similarity. But overall similarity is vague. Conversational context has the role of dissolving vagueness and determining a unique closeness ordering of worlds. In the strict conditional approach, conversational context has a further role: given the closeness ordering, context separates worlds which are close enough to form part of the horizon from worlds which are too far-fetched. If context does not rule otherwise, we by default start with a minimum horizon. In order to evaluate the truth of the sequence uttered, we first ask whether the antecedent of (1a) is actually true. If it is not, we expand the modal horizon such as to include less and less close worlds until we reach an antecedent world. For (1a) to be truly uttered, in all antecedent worlds in the horizon thus attained, there must be war. There must not yet be worlds in that horizon where all the superpowers throw their weapons into the sea for (1b) to be truly uttered as well. If this condition is fulfilled, the horizon has to be expanded further to accommodate the closest worlds which satisfy the antecedent of (1b). In these worlds, there has to be peace. 
When an utterance of the reverse sequence (1b)-(1a) is infelicitous, the modal horizon attained in evaluating (1b) comprises worlds satisfying the strengthened antecedent. Once the horizon of evaluating (1b) is attained, it is held fixed in evaluating (1a) instead of slipping back to the default minimum horizon. Even if some worlds where the US alone throws its weapons into the sea are closer to the evaluation world than any world where the other superpowers do so, too, the latter worlds in the modal horizon inherited from evaluating (1b) are relevant to evaluating (1a). So the reverse sequence leads to a contradiction. According to (1b), all worlds in the modal horizon where the US and the other superpowers throw their weapons into the sea are worlds where there is peace. And according to (1a), in these worlds (perhaps among others), there is war. 
If we take the strict conditional approach as a starting point for a unificatory account, it gives rise to an overall scheme for the description case. The scheme draws on the structural analogy between the strict conditional account of conditionals and Lewis’s (1973) analysis of incomplete descriptions. It does not presuppose any special relationship between conditionals and descriptions. The structural analogy is that in both conditionals and descriptions, the items talked about (worlds, things) are distinguished by their extreme position in a total preorder of items (being closest to the evaluation world, being most salient). Consider the two sequences

(4a) The pigs are grunting; 
(4b) but the pigs with floppy ears are not grunting.

(4b) The pigs with floppy ears are not grunting; 
(4a) #but the pigs are grunting.

The pigs are grunting is normally used as an incomplete description. Not all pigs whatsoever but only all pigs throughout some contextually restricted domain are claimed to be grunting. In his theory of incomplete descriptions, Lewis (1973, §5.3) posits a total preorder of individuals according to their contextual salience. When (4a)-(4b) is truly uttered, the pigs in (4a) refers to all and only the maximally salient pigs. The pigs referred to are selected by certain features which contribute to overall contextual salience. Judging from these features, the pigs are sufficiently salient to detach them from all other pigs. They do not have floppy ears and are grunting. The pigs with floppy ears in (4b) refers to all pigs in some set of less salient pigs. These pigs are not as salient with respect to the features contributing to overall contextual salience. Nevertheless they are the most salient pigs to satisfy an additional descriptive criterion: they have floppy ears. The pigs thereby selected are not grunting. 
Coming to (4b)-(4a), two ways of accounting for the infelicity of this sequence seem close in spirit to the strict conditional account. 
(i) The salience ordering shifts. When (4b) is uttered, the pigs with floppy ears referred to are raised to maximum salience. Their maximum salience is held fixed when (4a) is evaluated. Hence the pigs in (4a) refers (also) to these pigs. As a consequence, the sequence becomes inconsistent. The same pigs with floppy ears are claimed to be grunting and not grunting. 
(ii) The salience ordering is held fixed throughout the sequence. But some contextually determined threshold of maximum salience changes. The maximum is understood in a coarse-grained way. Things can be maximally salient, although, strictly speaking, they are not equally salient. If there is no eligible referent that meets the standard of maximum salience, the latter is lowered until there is an eligible referent. Then the lowered standard of maximum salience tends to be preserved in evaluating the utterances to come. The utterance of (4b)-(4a) is infelicitous because (4b) requires to fix the standard of maximum salience such as to make room for pigs with floppy ears as maximally salient. This standard of salience is then applied to the utterance of (4a). Again the sequence becomes inconsistent.
One advantage of the second alternative is that it may easily transferred to complete descriptions such as:

(5a) The closest gas stations are crummy; 
(5b) but the closest Shell stations are great.

(5b) The closest Shell stations are great;
(5a) ?but the closest gas stations are crummy.

If your car has fuel for one mile, gas stations within that distance might count as closest although they are not equally close. A contextual threshold determines what counts as closest. The same for other superlative expressions like cheapest. When (5a)-(5b) can be felicitously uttered but the reversal cannot, in evaluating (5b), one lowers the threshold of being a closest gas station such as to include the closest Shell stations. In dealing with the reverse sequence, this threshold is held fixed for evaluating (5a). The closest Shell stations are among the closest gas stations. This smooth construal makes the strict conditional account a strong candidate for a unified explanation.
I shall now discuss certain challenges to the dynamic strict conditional account. A key requirement is that the modal horizon, once expanded, does not easily contract again. Yet there are many contexts where domain contraction seems a matter of course. The following sequence is perfectly in order in many contexts (De Jager 2009, 75):

(6b) If Sophie had gone to the parade and not seen Pedro, she would have been upset.
(6a) But if Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro.

If the sequence is in order, the dynamic strict conditional account must make room for the possibility that it is true. According to the account, the modal horizon relevant to evaluating (6b) must include a world where Sophie goes to the parade and does not see Pedro. (6a) claims that, in all worlds in the horizon where Sophie goes to the parade, she does see Pedro. If the horizon is held fixed, the sequence becomes inconsistent. The only way for the sequence to become true is that the closest worlds where Sophie goes to the parade and does not see Pedro are removed from the horizon. For them to be removed, the horizon must shrink. Assume the horizon does shrink in between (6b) and (6a) The resulting puzzle is this: if the horizon is so easily contracted, shouldn’t the threat of inconsistency be sufficient to trigger contraction in normal instances of reverse sequences, e.g. the original sequence (1b)-(1a)? I shall later exploit measures to deal with the puzzle which are available to the proponent of the strict conditional account as well. 
However, there is a different problem which is genuine to the strict conditional account: the account seems too undiscriminatory. The motivation of expanding the modal horizon is that we tend to accommodate: when dealing with a counterfactual, we make room for considering a world w where the antecedent is true, even if this world is very far-fetched. But this motivation does not translate to subsequent counterfactuals with completely different, perhaps perfectly down-to-earth antecedents. It seems arbitrary to assume that all worlds which are at least as close to the evaluation world as w are relevant to evaluating these counterfactuals, even if there are much closer worlds satisfying their antecedents. This assumption provokes counterexamples. Here is an intuitive case. A security counselor says:

It takes amazing circumstances for an earthquake of magnitude 9+ and a hurricane to occur together. 
(7b) If an earthquake of magnitude 9+ and a hurricane occurred together, the plant would collapse;
(7a) but if an earthquake of magnitude 3 occurred, not even a window would shatter.​[8]​

The sequence (7b)-(7a) seems in order. But shouldn’t the closest (9+ earthquake & hurricane) world be less close than the closest (3 earthquake & window shatters) world? In that case, once the horizon is opened up such as to include the antecedent of (7b), an utterance of (7a) should come out infelicitous, at least as long as there is no domain contraction.
There are many uncertainties about this argument. One argument can be derived from Lewis. Lewis maintains that the overall similarity ordering should be figured out by reasoning back from the intuitively true counterfactuals and not vice versa (Lewis 1986, 53-55). As a consequence, one may dismiss the intuition that the closest world where the antecedent of (7b) is true is more far-fetched than the closest world where the antecedent of (7a) is true. But the more gerrymandered the ordering becomes, the less explanatory power the approach has. Moreover, it is very likely that counterexamples like (7b)-(7a) could be devised for any candidate similarity metrics, including the default metrics proposed by Lewis (cf. Lewis 1986, 47-48).
 There are other strategies to mend the strict conditional account. Perhaps the closeness ordering shifts. Or additional contextual selection criteria are imposed on the modal horizon. Yet all these measures would add to the theoretical costs of the account. 

2.2 A Pragmatic Approach

The strict conditional approach has met with resistance. Sarah Moss has advocated a pragmatic explanation which preserves the variably strict conditional approach. Both normal Sobel sequences and their infelicitous reversals are true under the same circumstances, judging from the variably strict semantics. The infelicity requires a pragmatic explanation. Moss draws a parallel between pragmatic phenomena known from epistemology and the Sobel phenomenon. Sometimes raising a claim to knowledge becomes irresponsible after a certain alternative has been mentioned:

Bernard has parked his car round the corner in New York some days ago:
Bernard: (8a) My car is around the corner; 
Anne: (8b) but cars get stolen in New York all the time.

Anne: (8b) Cars get stolen in New York; 
Bernard: (8a) #but my car is around the corner.

 Take any q which transparently entails not-p. It is a key premiss of the pragmatic account that, for p to be assertible, there must not be a salient epistemic possibility of q, at least as long as an utterance of p is not read as explicitly ruling out q. Anne’s utterance of the generic (8b) seems sufficient to raise the epistemic possibility that Bernard’s car has been stolen. The connection presumably rests on a simple heuristic rather than some more regimented exercise of probabilistic reasoning. Bernard’s subsequent utterance of (8a) is normally infelicitous. For his reaction is irresponsible once the epistemic possibility that his car has been stolen is on the table. Of course, Bernard may utter (8a) with a suitable stress pattern to rule out the epistemic possibility of his car having been stolen. But apart from such special uses, his utterance will be infelicitous. Moss transfers this explanation to the standard examples of infelicitous Sobel sequences:

(1b) If the USA and the other superpowers threw their weapons into the sea, there would be peace; 
(1a) #but if the USA threw its weapons into the sea, there would be war.

An utterance of this sequence comes out infelicitous, says Moss, if uttering (1b) raises (1a´) to epistemic salience:

(1a´) If the US threw its weapons into the sea, the other superpowers might do so, too.

For all we know, one of the closest worlds where the US throws its weapons into the sea is one where the other superpowers do so, too. In the standard logics for counterfactuals, (1b) and (1a´) together are inconsistent with (1a). Thus, as long as (1a´) has not been ruled out, it becomes irresponsible to utter (1a).
Coming to my critical appraisal, it is very difficult to tell how we assess overall similarity of worlds in a context. Hence it is difficult to tell under what circumstances we take seriously or dismiss the epistemic possibility that (1a´) is true: among the closest worlds where the US throws its weapons into the sea, there are worlds where the other superpowers do so, too. Still there are cases where Moss’s account taxes credulity. The conjunct p2 by which a perfectly mundane antecedent p1 is strenghened to p1 & p2 may appear arbitrarily far-fetched and unconnected to the unstrenghened antecedent possibility p1. Moss comes closest to discussing this issue in considering the following example:

(9b) If Sophie had gone to the parade and been shorter than she actually is, she would not have seen Pedro.
(9a) But if Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro.

Consider the epistemic possibility 

(9a´) If Sophie had gone to the parade, she might have been shorter than she actually is. 

Moss admits that (9a´) is not easily raised to salience. She hints at a story about height-affecting drugs as an additional context of uttering (9b). Moss also grants that there might be contexts where we willingly neglect the possibility expressed by (9a´). She predicts that in these contexts, (9b)-(9a) will be felicitously uttered (Moss 2012, 575-576). However, these alternatives do not exhaust the contexts of uttering (9b)–(9a). Consider the following dialogue:

Anne: Is Sophie a short or a tall person?
Bernard: Sophie is rather tall. Remember how difficult it was to see Pedro when we went to the parade last year? 
(9a) If Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro. 
(9b) But if Sophie had gone to the parade and been shorter than she actually is, she would not have seen Pedro.

This dialogue seems in order. Bernard uses the sequence (9a)-(9b) to underline that Sophie’s height would have made a difference to seeing Pedro. But it would be strange for Bernard to say:

…
Bernard: Sophie is rather tall. Remember how difficult it was to see Pedro when we went to the parade last year? 
(9b) If Sophie had gone to the parade and been shorter than she actually is, she would not have seen Pedro. 
(9a) #But if Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro.

In the context of the dialogue, the reverse sequence (9b)-(9a) is odd.​[9]​ According to Moss’s explanation, (9b) makes salient the epistemic possibility that Sophie might have been shorter than she actually is if she had gone to the parade. But Moss herself grants that it is not easy to raise this possibility; it takes a special context like the height-affecting drugs story to do so. It is doubtful that the dialogues just considered provide such a context.
These doubts are further nourished by the following example: 

Anne: Sophie is smaller than 1.70m.
Bernard: (9b) If Sophie had gone to the parade and been shorter than 1.70m, she would not have seen Pedro. 
Nina: (9a*) Actually, Sophie went to the parade and saw Pedro. 
Thus, she is not shorter than 1.70m.

If Moss is right, uttering (9b) raises the epistemic possibility that Sophie might have been shorter than 1.70m (and not seen Pedro) if she had gone to the parade. But this epistemic possibility together with (9b) should make (9a*) infelicitous to utter, given the simplified standard account which is used in Moss’s pragmatic solution, at least if we assume conjunction conditionalisation ((p&q)(p>q)).​[10]​ We may deviate from the simplified standard account or deny conjunction conditionalisation. Alternatively, we may claim that uttering (9a*) explicitly rules out the epistemic possibility raised by uttering (9b): if Sophie had gone to the parade, she might have been shorter than 1.70m. After all, (9a*) entails the negation of this conditional. But entailing not-p is not as a matter of course sufficient for an utterance to explicitly rule out p. In any case, such ad hoc measures add to the costs of the approach.
Moreover, there is a suspicion that we will often have to resort to ad hoc measures like denying conjunction conditionalisation and regarding propositions entailed by explicit statements as explicitly ruling out epistemic possibilities. One purported counterexample to the strict conditional approach was:

(6b) If Sophie had gone to the parade and not seen Pedro, she would have been upset.
(6a) But if Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro.

The proponent of the pragmatic approach also faces difficulties with this sequence. One would expect that the following epistemic possibility is raised by (6b):

(6a´) If Sophie had gone to the parade, she might not have seen Pedro.

Once this possibility is raised, (6a) is infelicitous to utter. It has to be noted, though, that according to the pragmatic account (6a) and (6a´) are duals. Due to their transparent inconsistency, (6a) might be used to express that (6a´) is to be ruled out. Then one cannot be charged with irresponsibly neglecting a salient possibility in uttering (6a).
A more serious challenge arises from a disanalogy to Moss’s own epistemological example. Assume I am Bernard in the car case. The following seems infelicitous for me to utter:

I know two things: 
(8a) my car is round the corner; 
(8b) #but cars get stolen in New York.

Uttering I know two things requires me to keep track of the two things I know. Take any q which transparently entails not-p. It is a key premiss of the pragmatic account that, for p to be assertible or claimed as known, there must not be a salient epistemic possibility of q, at least as long as an utterance of p is not read as explicitly ruling out q. None of the two knowledge claims (8a) and (8b) must raise an epistemic alternative which is incompatible with the other one. Judging from the master example used to introduce the pragmatic account, in uttering (8b), I raise to salience the epistemic possibility that my car has been stolen. My car having been stolen entails that my car is not round the corner. Hence given my utterance of (8a), uttering (8b) is infelicitous. Now consider the perfectly analogous case:

I know two things: 
(1a) If the USA threw its weapons into the sea. there would be war; 
(1b) but if the USA and the other superpowers all threw their weapons into the sea, there would be peace.

This seems perfectly in order. One can claim to know (1a)-(1b) in one breath. But in Moss’s account, we would expect the sequence to be infelicitous. She predicts that uttering (1b) raises to salience an epistemic possibility which is incompatible with my claiming to know (1a):

(1a´) If the US threw its weapons into the sea, the other superpowers might do so, too.

Here the analogy drawn by Moss herself between (1b)-(1a) and the original car example (8b)-(8a)  limits the available ad hoc measures. For instance, it will be difficult to claim that the respective explicit knowledge ascriptions somehow cancel the epistemic possibility that (1a´) (in the conditional example) but not the epistemic possibility that my car has been stolen (in the epistemological example), or that there is no backwards scorekeeping from the second knowledge claim to the first.

3 From Descriptions to Conditionals
3.1 The Simple Anaphoric Solution

The problem of the strict conditional approach is that, by accommodating the strengthened antecedent, too many irrelevant worlds are included in the modal horizon. One problem of the pragmatic approach is that it purports epistemic possibilities to be raised where we neglect them or rule them out. An option that remains is to find a mechanism which works as follows: in a reverse sequence, the strengthened antecedent of the conditional uttered first makes just the closest worlds where the strengthened antecedent is true relevant to evaluating the subsequent conditional. In my view, this effect is explained by anaphoric binding.
In line with this general strategy, I proceed to an argument line from descriptions to conditionals. I shall start with Mirja Holst’s (2013) discussion of the two sequences (3a)-(3b) and (3b)-(3a):

(3a) The pig is grunting; 
(3b) but the pig with floppy ears is not grunting.

(3b) The pig with floppy ears is not grunting; 
(3a) #but the pig is grunting.

According to Lewis’s (1973) account, (3a)-(3b) can be felicitously uttered provided there is precisely one contextually most salient pig without floppy ears and one contextually most salient pig with floppy ears, the former being more salient than the latter. Holst adds an explanation for the infelicity of the reversal: (3b)-(3a) may be read anaphorically; in this reading, the sequence becomes inconsistent. The expression the pig as it occurs in (3a) is anaphorically bound to the pig with floppy ears as it occurs in (3b). The same pig is referred to in (3b) and (3a). The mere availability of the anaphoric reading makes the sequence infelicitous to utter. The anaphoric reading is not available for (3a)-(3b): the pig with floppy ears in (3b) cannot be anaphorically bound to the pig in (3a). The account can be easily transferred to plural descriptions like (4a)-(4b) and its reversal.
The anaphoric approach needs elaboration. I shall address two problems:
The first problem: why does the mere availability of an inconsistent reading lead to infelicity if there is also a good reading? Take a situation where the normal sequence (3a)-(3b) can be felicitously uttered but the reversal cannot. Then there seems to be an alternative how to read (3b)-(3a): the most salient individual is selected, the most salient pig with floppy ears in interpreting (3b) and an even more salient pig without floppy ears in interpreting (3a), just as when we interpret the felicitous normal sequence (3a)-(3b). Why don’t we settle as a matter of course for this reading and are troubled by the anaphoric one?
My answer is that the inconsistent reading of (3b)-(3a) cannot be discarded.​[11]​ I shall take a brief look at the linguistics of definite noun phrases (NPs). Normally, a definite NP like the pig is expected to refer to some individual which has been explicitly mentioned before - the anaphoric reading. However, as distinguished from pronouns like they, definite NPs contain descriptive material of their own. Thus, they provide the opportunity of accommodation (cf. van der Sandt 1991, 344): when no suitable referent has been introduced before, a new referent may be introduced by an existence presupposition (there is one uniquely salient pig): the accommodating or presuppositional reading. Yet accommodation is merely a ‘repair strategy, which enables us to establish an anaphoric link even if the current discourse does not provide one.’(van der Sandt 1991, 345) So to van der Sandt, the accommodating or presuppositional reading also is anaphoric. It creates an anaphoric initiator. It establishes a referent for the anaphoric expression by presupposition even if that referent has not been mentioned before. Nevertheless, for simplicity I shall reserve the term ‘anaphoric reading’ for a situation where the referent has been mentioned before, and contrast the anaphoric reading to the accommodating or initiator reading. In a felicitous utterance of (3a)-(3b), the descriptive material introduced by the pig in (3a) does not as a matter of course match the additional descriptive material introduced by the pig with floppy ears in (3b). If the pig referred to in (3a) does not qualify as a pig with floppy ears, the utterance may be felicitous. We settle for initiator readings of both the pig (3a) (assuming (3a)-(3b) is uttered out of the blue) and the pig with floppy ears (3b).
For (3b)-(3a), this repair strategy is of no avail given two plausible assumptions. Firstly, the initiator reading would have to select the most salient individual meeting the descriptive condition. Secondly, uttering a sentence like (3b) raises the referent of the definite NP in the sentence uttered to maximum salience (cf. von Heusinger 2006). In a situation where the normal sequence (3a)-(3b) is felicitous, the pig with floppy ears is not the most salient pig from the outset. Yet uttering (3b) raises the pig with floppy ears to maximum salience Consider an utterance of the reverse sequence (3b)-(3a). Once (3b) has been uttered, the pig with floppy ears inevitably is maximally salient when it comes to evaluating (3a). Any pig with floppy ears is necessarily a pig but not vice versa. Hence the pig with floppy ears satisfies the descriptive condition imposed by the pig in (3a). Putting things together, there is no consistent reading of (3b)-(3a). In the anaphoric reading, both NPs refer to the same pig. The same goes for an initiator reading. The pig would have to pick out the contextually most salient pig, which is the pig with floppy ears.​[12]​
The second problem with Holst’s account: is it really the case that the pig can be anaphorically bound to the pig with floppy ears but not vice versa? In fact, anaphoric relationships can go both ways (von Heusinger 2006, 50). Take

(10a) Listen, the cat and the dog are quarrelling; 
(10b) the angry cat is hissing aggressively.

We do not need any information to accept an anaphoric reading of (10a)-(10b) over and above the information required to utter (10a) anyway: there is a unique most salient cat. Of course, we need to accommodate the information that the cat is angry. Still sometimes anaphoric binding from a poorer to a richer NP seems perfectly all right without further ado.
If anaphoric binding can go from a poorer antecedent to a richer anaphoric term, we need to explain why we on the one hand accept an anaphoric reading of (10a)-(10b) and on the other hand eschew an anaphoric reading of (3a)-(3b). One key explanatory feature is the threatening inconsistency. In the case of (10a)-(10b), the anaphoric reading does not lead to an inconsistency. Moreover, when we accept the anaphoric reading, the cat as mentioned in uttering (10a) is the most salient candidate for the angry cat mentioned in uttering (10b). This sufficiently motivates the anaphoric reading of (10a)-(10b). To be sure, there is a mismatch in descriptive material. It is not a matter of course that the cat referred to in (10a) satisfies the additional material of being angry. But as long as there are no clues to the contrary, we tend to accept the anaphoric reading and to accommodate the additional information that the cat talked about in (10a) is angry. However, in the case of (3a)-(3b), there is an additional clue against the anaphoric reading: the latter would lead to an inconsistency. Hence there is a motive to avoid it. But this motive also applies to the reverse sequence (3b)-(3a). The question becomes what prevents an anaphoric reading of (3a)-(3b) as contrasted to (3b)-(3a). I see an asymmetry between the two directions of anaphoric binding between a poorer and a richer definite NP. When the descriptively richer NP comes first, it provides a clear candidate for anaphoric binding. The richer NP satisfies the descriptive condition imposed by the poorer one. Things are different when a descriptively poorer NP comes first. It does not as a matter of course satisfy the condition imposed by a succeeding descriptively richer NP. So we have no clear candidate for anaphoric binding. When we evaluate (10a)-(10b), the angry cat is no clear candidate for anaphoric binding. So there is the principled possibility of an initiator reading of (10b), which would require the presupposition that the cat referred to in (10a) is not angry. In a situation where we take the cat referred to in (10a) not to be angry, we settle for the initiator reading. But so far there is no cue for this reading. In contrast to (3a)-(3b), there is no threat of inconsistency that could drive us toward an initiator reading. As for (3a)-(3b), the anaphoric reading is avoided because it leads to inconsistency. Exploiting the descriptive mismatch, one presupposes that the pig referred to in uttering (3a) does not have floppy ears. As for (3b)-(3a), no mismatch in descriptive material comes to our aid. The pig with floppy ears must select the referent of the pig. The account can easily be transferred to plural sequences:

(4a) The pigs are grunting; 
(4b) but the pigs with floppy ears are not grunting.

(4b) The pigs with floppy ears are not grunting; 
(4a) #but the pigs are grunting.

The main difference to singular sequences like (3a)-(3b) is that they do not presuppose that, for each description, there is a single most salient referent. So far the explanation is confined to incomplete descriptions. 
A greater challenge is to transfer the account to complete descriptions as in the gas station case:

(5a) The closest gas stations are crummy; 
(5b) but the closest Shell stations are great.

(5b) The closest Shell stations are great;
(5a) ?but the closest gas stations are crummy.

For the anaphoric explanation to apply to this example, the sequence (5b)-(5a) must be read thus: the closest gas stations referred to in uttering (5a) are anaphorically bound to the closest Shell stations referred to in uttering (5b). The closest gas stations one refers to comprise the closest Shell stations. As a consequence, the same Shell stations are claimed to be great and crummy. In contrast, (5a)-(5b) may be felicitously uttered because the poorer NP the closest gas stations is not guaranteed to satisfy the additional descriptive material of being a Shell station.
So far all exemplary descriptions have been treated alike. Yet there is a striking difference between (4b)-(4a) and (5b)-(5a). There are means of excluding the anaphoric reading in the latter but not in the former case:​[13]​

(4b) The pigs with floppy ears are not grunting; 
(4a´) #but the pigs are not those with floppy ears.

(5b) The closest Shell stations are great;
(5a´) but the closest gas stations are no Shell stations.

I shall provide an explanation for the difference in felicity between incomplete descriptions like (4b)-(4a´) and complete descriptions like (5b)-(5a´). In our evaluating (4b) and (4a´), contextual salience inevitably selects the same pigs, regardless of whether we settle for the anaphoric or attempt an accommodating reading. In contrast, in our evaluating (5a´), there is something besides salience that allows to keep the closest gas stations and the closest Shell stations apart. Even if the Shell stations are maximally salient gas stations, they may still be less close than the closest gas stations.​[14]​ This allows for an accommodating initiator reading which introduces the closest gas stations as new referents. The presupposition is that there are gas stations which are closer than the closest Shell stations. Although the closest Shell stations are maximally salient gas stations, the initiator interpretation disqualifies them as being less close than other closest gas stations. This neat account of (5b)-(5a´) leads to a new riddle, though: the closest Shell stations and the closest gas stations can be kept apart by presupposing that the latter are closer than the former. Why don’t we make this presupposition in order to get a consistent reading of (5b)-(5a)? I shall address this question in the next section.
In sum, there are two major points where Holst goes wrong. It is not the ambiguity of (3b)-(3a) and (4b)-(4a) between an inconsistent anaphoric reading and a consistent reading that makes for infelicity. The infelicity arises because there is no ambiguity. There is only an inconsistent reading. In turn, there is an ambiguity between an anaphoric and an accommodating initiator reading that makes for the felicity of uttering (3a)-(3b) and (4a)-(4b), respectively. The ambiguity allows to avoid the anaphoric reading.

3.2 The Anaphoric Solution in Need of Qualification

In this section, I shall tackle two difficulties. The first is non-maximality. Sometimes plural definites allow for exceptions (Malamud 2012, Križ forthcoming):

All the professors except Smith smiled and then left, leaving Smith behind. 
(11a) the professors smiled.
(11a´) #The professors smiled and then (all) left the room.

If domain restriction to the smiling professors were in place, the utterance of (11a´) should be felicitous. (All) would just pick up the professors in the domain. Since uttering (11a) is felicitous in the scenario but uttering (11a´) is infelicitous, there is no domain restriction to the smiling professors. In (11a), the professors is not read as all the professors in a contextually restricted domain, excluding Smith, but as allowing for exceptions, comparable to a generic quantifier. I shall focus on a different example:

You have left house. A storm is approaching.
We have to go back!
(12a) The windows are open; 
(12b) but the windows in the living room are fortunately closed.

The reversal is infelicitous.
…
(12b) The windows in the living room are fortunately closed;
(12a) #but the windows are open.

Consider (12a)-(12b). All windows in the house being of interest, uttering (12a) is not simply a case of restricting the domain of reference to some windows in the house, not including those in the living room. The salience mechanism must be supplemented by the possibility of a non-maximal reading: (12a) can be truly uttered even if only some of the most salient windows are open.
The consequence of the asymmetry between (12a)-(12b) and (12b)-(12a) is not that my simple explanation is false. Not any Sobel sequence is a case of non-maximality. And the original anaphoric solution can be extended to the non-maximality case by a simple amendment: in a Sobel sequence, an explicit NP in subject position makes its referents not only maximally salient, but more salient than any other possible referents satisfying the same descriptive material. The amendment is motivated by the plural pig sequence: 

(4a) The pigs are grunting; 
(4b) but the pigs with floppy ears are not grunting.

(4b) The pigs with floppy ears are not grunting; 
(4a) #but the pigs are grunting.

There are contexts where the normal plural sequence (4a)-(4b) allows for a non-maximal reading. Even in such contexts, the reverse sequence (4b)-(4a) is infelicitous. Given my new assumption, the infelicity of (4b)–(4a) even in an attempted non-maximal reading can be explained as follows: firstly, the non-maximal reading of an incomplete description, too, would have to select among the most salient referents. Secondly, by uttering (4b) the pigs with floppy ears are made more salient than any other pigs. Thus, even in an attempted non-maximal reading, the pigs in (4a) would have to refer to these maximally salient pigs with floppy ears. Again we get a contradiction. The most salient pigs with floppy ears are claimed to be grunting and not grunting. This also allows to explain the infelicity of the following sequence:

(12b) The windows in the living room are closed;
(12a´) #but the windows are not those in the living room.

In any reading, the windows in (12a´), would have to select among the most salient windows. These windows being those in the living room, one cannot deflect reference by saying that one does not refer to them.​[15]​
Having dealt with non-maximality, I shall now address a second problem that will require me to revise the account. What accounts for the difference in felicity between the following sequences?

(5b) The closest Shell stations are great;
(5a) ?but the closest gas stations are crummy.

(5b) The closest Shell stations are great;
(5a´) but the closest gas stations are no Shell stations.

I have explained the infelicity of (5b)-(5a) by anaphoric binding. We read the closest gas stations as bound to the closest Shell stations. Yet why do we avoid the anaphoric reading in (5b)–(5a´) but not in (5b)–(5a)? When introducing the asymmetry between (5a)-(5b) and its reversal, I indicated that not anyone shares my feeling that (5b)-(5a) is marked. Since my explanation will turn out to be rather speculative, one may dismiss the evidence together with the explanation. Unfortunately, the explanation cannot be simply disregarded. My unified solution for descriptions and conditionals depends on it. But at least my account of descriptions as given so far could be preserved even if the explanation failed. If one does not share my intuition that (5b)-(5a) is marked, one may replace the modular process to be developed by the salience mechanism as presented so far. I will not elaborate this replacement, but I trust it can be easily done, the basic model being so easy: whenever a normal sequence is felicitously uttered but its reversal is not, the first sentence raises some item(s) to maximum salience as candidate(s) for the NP in the second sentence to be anaphorically bound to. In the normal but not in the reverse sequence a mismatch in descriptive material comes to our rescue and prevents the inconsistent reading. 
Coming to my discussion of the contrast in felicity between (5b)-(5a) and (5b)-(5a´), I shall present an explanation which I take to be more speculative than the theory offered so far, taking inspiration from the debate of so-called ‘semantic P-600’ effects in cognitive linguistics. A P-600 is a peculiar peak in electrical brain activity which is elicited (among other things) by hearing or reading certain semantic anomalies, for instance

(13) The fox that hunted the poachers…

One theory about the P-600 effect is the following (Bornkessel-Schlesewsky and Schlesewsky 2008, 67): there are two distinct processes involved in interpreting (13) which do not match. On the one hand, there is ‘core argument interpretation’ which does not take into account the semantic implausibility of the fox hunting the poachers but only elementary linguistic data like position of words, morphology and so on. The fox is interpreted as the actor and the poachers as the undergoers of hunting. On the other hand, there is the processing of ‘plausibility information’ which has us interpret the poachers as the actors and the fox as the undergoer. There is a third process of generalised mapping which checks whether the other two processes lead to matching results. The P-600 occurs when the results of the former two processes cannot be mapped. Of course, this theory is only one explanation subject to further research.​[16]​ But I shall use it merely by way of a rough analogy. 
I know of no comparable neurolinguistic evidence on Sobel sequences. But one may hypothetically transfer the overall scheme to the problem under discussion: interpretation does not simply proceed under the minimum requirement of finding a consistent reading as far as permitted by conventional meaning. Understanding has a modular structure. It consists of several processes of different types. Some of these processes are sensitive only to a certain kind of cue. The results of these processes may irremediably clash instead of being subordinated to key requirements like consistency. 
In the explanation of P-600 effects, different interpretation tasks are performed by separate processes; the results are then checked for their match. We may postulate a distinction comparable to ‘core argument interpretation’ and the ‘plausibility heuristics’ also for Sobel sequences: I shall call them ‘anaphora processing’ and ‘consistency monitoring’. Anaphora processing tests a discourse whether there are certain cues for anaphoric relationships, cues which are more intimately connected to processing anaphora than checking for a contradiction in the verb phrases (x is grunting –x is not grunting) that would result from an anaphoric reading. For my proposal to be successful, anaphora processing of the subject NP must be insensitive to such a contradiction, just as core processing in the case of (13) is insensitive to the implausibility of the fox being the actor and the poachers being the undergoers of hunting. In contrast, comparably to the plausibility heuristics in P-600 effects, ‘consistency monitoring’ checks for aspects of rationality like consistency. If the outcomes of the two processes do not match, we feel that an utterance is infelicitous. 
These considerations give rise to a general recipe of dealing with reverse sequences like the pig sequence (3b)-(3a): in a reverse sequence, the cues for anaphoric binding are so strong that there is a mismatch between the results of anaphora processing and consistency monitoring. The main cue for anaphora is that the descriptive material of the first NP (the pig with floppy ears) is satisfied by the second (the pig). In contrast, consistency monitoring finds a contradiction in claiming the same pig to be grunting and not grunting. This more general view requires me to revise the simple explanation hitherto developed. My exemplary explanation for the infelicity of (3b)-(3a) was that uttering (3b) raises the pig with floppy ears to maximum salience. An initiator reading would have to settle for the most salient pig (which, just as in the anaphoric reading, is the pig with floppy ears). While I do not think that this explanation is actually false, it might overdetermine the explanandum. The infelicity is already explained by there being strong overall cues for anaphoric binding, the result being a conflict with consistency-monitoring. However, in a moment we will see that, sometimes, the original account from section (3.1) does explanatory work of its own.
I have introduced the new framework of the modular processes of interpretation in order to explain the difference between (5b)-(5a) and (5b)-(5a´). 

(5b) The closest Shell stations are great;
(5a) ?but the closest gas stations are crummy.

(5b) The closest Shell stations are great;
(5a´) but the closest gas stations are no Shell stations.

We have to explain why in (5b)-(5a´), as contrasted to (5b)-(5a), there is no clash between anaphora processing and consistency-monitoring. The amendment goes as follows: there are certain cues against anaphoric binding which are registered by anaphora processing: are no Shell Stations is such a cue. We immediately relate this phrase to the strengthening part of the antecedent. It makes explicit the requirement that the referents of the closest gas stations and the closest Shell stations are different. The closest gas stations are explicitly claimed not to satisfy the strengthening part of the description. So there is no clash between anaphora processing and consistency monitoring. In contrast, in (5b)–(5a), there are no such cues against anaphoric binding to countervail the cues in its favour. The threat of a contradiction is not registered as a cue by anaphora processing. As a consequence, there is a clash with consistency monitoring.
I have already emphasised that there is no equivalent to (5b)-(5a´) for the pig sequence:

(4b) The pigs with floppy ears are not grunting; 
(4a´) #but the pigs are not those with floppy ears.





3.3 Transferring the Anaphoric Solution to Conditionals
3.3.1 Counterfactuals –The Simple Story

So far I have discussed Sobel sequences which clearly consist of definite descriptions. Now I shall address the main challenge to the anaphoric account: how it may be transferred to conditionals.
The initial examples (1)-(5) indicate that conditionals and descriptions show striking similarities when it comes to strengthening the antecedent and the subject NP, respectively, and reverting the resulting sequences. This analogy already provides good reasons to treat both kinds of expressions alike. The most straightforward way of doing so is to treat conditionals as referring expressions. There is cross-linguistic evidence that ‘…individuals and possibilities are on a par for the purposes of reference and anaphora.’(Bittner 2001, 36) Everyday language provides expressions which refer to possibilities. And these expressions allow for presupposition and anaphoric binding in the same way as definite descriptions. It is tempting to include conditionals among these expressions. The only argument that would preclude one from doing so is Lewis’s argument against the limit assumption (there is a unique set of closest antecedent worlds). However, few are convinced by Lewis’s arguments against the limit assumption (discussion summarised in Swanson 2012). They even seem in tension with Lewis’s own view that overall similarity of worlds should not be determined by our intuitions about similarity but by examples of intuitively true counterfactuals (Lewis 1986). So I do not reckon the limit assumption problematic. 
If we accept the limit assumption and reject Stalnaker’s uniqueness assumption (there is a unique world to be selected), nothing prevents us from analysing conditionals as referring expressions, using a variant of Stalnaker’s selection function proposed by Philippe Schlenker in order to give a unified analysis of conditionals and descriptions. The choice function is a function from an element d and a set E of elements to a set of elements. For conditionals, d is the evaluation world and E some set of worlds where the antecedent is true. For descriptions, d is a ‘point of reference’ and E a set of individuals satisfying the descriptive condition in the subject NP (Schlenker 2004, 436-437).
  Schlenker’s plural choice function has to satisfy the following conditions:
Condition 1: For each element d and each non-empty set E of elements, f(d, E) ≠ # and f(d, E)  E. 
Condition 2: For each element d, each set E and each set E´, if E´ E and f(d, E) ∩ E´ ≠ Ø, then f(d, E´) = f(d, E) ∩ E´. 
Condition 3: For each element d and each set E, f(d, E) = # iff E = Ø.
Condition 4: For each element d and each subset E of the domain, if d ϵ E, then d ϵ f(d, E).

These conditions ensure a centred ordering, which may be interpreted as a mere salience ordering or, in the case of counterfactuals, as an ordering of overall similarity of worlds to the evaluation world d.’ The plural selection function perfectly corresponds to van Heusinger’s choice function for definite descriptions, which already has been implicitly used in my amendment of Holst’s theory (von Heusinger 2004, 318-326). When we interpret an incomplete description the F are G, the choice function selects the most salient individuals which are F. 
It seems that Stalnakers’s selection function (or some variant of it) and von Heusinger’s choice function are only applications of one common analysis of conditionals and descriptions. In this vein, Philippe Schlenker claims that ‘…if should be seen as the form taken by the word the when it is applied to a description of possible worlds.’(Schlenker 2004, 418) He analyses both ‘if’ and ‘the’ by the same operator . The operator serves to unambiguously select individuals (the) and possibilities (if), respectively, which satisfy a certain descriptive material and are privileged by a contextually supplied ordering. 
In the following, I shall assume that the referential analysis of conditionals as definite descriptions is correct. In order to derive an account of Sobel sequences, we need anaphoric binding over sequences of conditionals. Anaphoric binding is used in literature to articulate the relationship between the antecedent and the consequent of a conditional. Just as if is interpreted as the form which the definite article takes when it is applied to possibilities, then is interpreted as an anaphoric pronoun which is bound by the possibilities denoted by the antecedent: ‘…the dependent if-clause sets up a topical possibility, which is linked to the modal anaphor then in the matrix comment.’(Bittner 2001, 39) The very same worlds that are selected by if are selected by then. These worlds must be worlds where the consequent is true for the conditional to be true. In conditionals where then is inappropriate, still the possibilities referred to by the consequent must be seen as anaphorically bound to the possibilities referred to by the antecedent.​[17]​ 
My new claim is that if can also be anaphorically bound to possibilities that have already been introduced into a discourse. This opens up a line for explaining the infelicity of reverse Sobel sequences. Take

(1a) If the USA threw its weapons into the sea, there would be war; 
(1b) but if the USA and the other superpowers all threw their weapons into the sea, there would be peace.

(1b) If the USA and the other superpowers threw their weapons into the sea, there would be peace; 
(1a) #but if the USA threw its weapons into the sea, there would be war.

In uttering (1a), one claims that the (closest) worlds where the US throws its weapons into the sea are worlds where there is war. In uttering (1b), one claims that the (closest) worlds where the US and the other superpowers throw their weapons into the sea are worlds where there is peace. Just as the pig sequence (3a)-(3b), the sequence (1a)–(1b) allows for a consistent reading. The antecedent of (1b) comes with additional descriptive material compared to the antecedent of (1a). In the worlds referred to in (1b), the other superpowers must also throw their weapons into the sea. The antecedent worlds of (1a) do not trivially satisfy the additional descriptive material. There are no decisive cues for anaphoric binding. The anaphoric reading is avoided in favour of an initiator reading: closest worlds where all the superpowers throw their weapons into the sea are accommodated by the presupposition that these worlds are less close than some worlds where the US alone throws its weapons into the sea.
In contrast, uttering (1b)-(1a) is normally infelicitous because there are sufficiently strong cues for an anaphoric reading. The descriptive material introduced by the antecedent of (1b), being a world where the US and the other superpowers throw their weapons into the sea, obviously satisfies the weaker descriptive condition later introduced by the antecedent of (1a), being a world where the US throws its weapons into the sea. So there are strong cues that both conditionals refer to the same worlds made salient by uttering (1b). These worlds are subject to inconsistent claims. I grant the possibility that one may sometimes read (1a) as saying ‘the US only...’. But this reading is not accepted as a salient alternative when the reverse sequence feels infelicitous. 
One may find it unnecessary to invoke anaphora and try to achieve the same by a parameter of contextual relevance, which is sensitive to mentioning antecedent possibilities. One account along these lines is the strict conditional account considered; there are others (De Jager 2009, Ichikawa 2011, Lewis forthcoming).​[18]​ Yet there are reasons to prefer the anaphoric explanation. There is a tendency to bind the weakened antecedent exclusively to the worlds introduced before by the strengthened one, as the following sequence shows:

(1b) If the USA and the other superpowers threw their weapons into the sea, there would be peace; 
(1a´) #but if the USA threw its weapons into the sea, there might be war.

If mentioning antecedent possibilities merely makes them relevant to evaluating the counterfactuals to come, one should expect (1b)-(1a´) to be felicitous. Nothing precludes that there are other relevant possibilities where the USA alone throws its weapons into the sea and there is war. But if there is a tendency to anaphorically bind the antecedent of the might-counterfactual precisely to the antecedent possibilities mentioned before, the sequence is correctly predicted to be infelicitous. Perhaps intuitions are not overly strong because use of might is notoriously flexible. For instance, it may invite a pragmatic completion by ‘the US only’. Still (1b)-(1a´) sounds much worse than the corresponding normal sequence (1a´)-(1b). Worlds referred to in uttering (1b) are not simply relevant. They tend to be uniquely relevant.

3.3.2 Counterfactuals –The Story Qualified

I have presented a simple anaphoric approach to counterfactuals. However, the counterexamples to the strict conditional account require more fine-grained distinctions. I distinguish two kinds of felicitous reverse sequences. (i) One may purposively exploit the expressive power of a normally infelicitous sequence. Assume you want to convey (without explicitly saying so) that Mary would not have married John. You may say

[14b] If John had proposed to Mary and she had said yes, he would have been really happy.
[14a] But if John had proposed, he would have been really unhappy.(Moss 2012, 574)

By deliberately using a sequence that would normally be infelicitous, you may pragmatically communicate you want the audience to adopt an initiator reading notwithstanding the strong cues for an anaphoric reading. You emphasise that there are two different sets of possibilities, a less close one where John proposes and is accepted, and a closer one where he proposes and is rejected.
(ii) There are sequences where we normally avoid the anaphoric reading. Take de Jager’s

(6b) If Sophie had gone to the parade and not seen Pedro, she would have been upset.
(6a) But if Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro.

Cory Nichols has come up with further examples:​[19]​

(15b) If John played violin, he would own a violin;
(15a) if John played an instrument, it would be piano.

(16b) If John had a million dollars, he would buy a house;
(16a) if John had a hundred thousand, he would move into a bigger apartment in the neighbourhood.

So given the right cues, the anaphoric reading is avoided. What are these cues, and how can they achieve what the threat of an outright inconsistency cannot achieve: the anaphoric reading is abandoned in favour of an initiator reading? 
Concerning (6b)-(6a), I have postulated a distinction between two processes: anaphora processing, which is sensitive to cues for anaphoric binding, and consistency monitoring. If the strengthening part of the preceding conditional’s antecedent is explicitly denied in the consequent of the succeeding conditional, the explicit denial is a cue that the anaphoric reading is to be avoided. Take again the gas station example: 

(5b) The closest Shell stations are great;
(5a´) but the closest gas stations are no Shell stations.

The closest gas stations are explicitly claimed not to be Shell stations. The latter are particularly salient but less close than other gas stations. Analogously, the worlds to be considered in (6a) are explicitly claimed not to be worlds satisfying the strengthened antecedent condition imposed in (6b).
Consider (15b)-(15a): 

(15b) If John played violin, he would own a violin;
(15a) if John played an instrument, it would be piano.

The it in (15a) is a donkey anaphora. The standard reading has it that all instruments John would play are pianos (see discussion in Kanazawa 1994, Williamson 2007, 195-199). Hence the sequence structurally resembles (6b)-(6a). The consequent of (15a) is obviously incompatible with the strengthening part of the antecedent of (15b) and thus read as denying the latter. 
While I think that varying (15a) to …, he would play piano wouldn’t remove the donkey relationship between instrument and piano, here is a variant which avoids the donkey:

(17b) If John played violin in the orchestra, he would own a violin;
(17a) if John had anything to do with the orchestra, he would be the conductor.

I see two possibilities: we do or we do not read the consequent of (17a) as exhaustive (he would be the conductor and not play violin). In the latter case, there simply is no contradiction. In the former case, we get a core processing cue against anaphoric binding just as in (6b)-(6a), the consequent of (17a) denying the strengthening part of the antecedent of (17b).
Consider (16b)-(16a), which already has been introduced:

(16b) If John had a million dollars, he would buy a house;
(16a) if John had a hundred thousand dollars, he would move into a bigger apartment in the neighbourhood.

The numeral is naturally read as a hundred thousand and not significantly more. I have granted that one may also read ‘the US’ in (1a) as ‘the US and no other country’. When it is appropriate to read an utterance of (1b)-(1a) in this way, the utterance is felicitous. But this reading is not the standard way of understanding ‘the US throws its weapons into the sea’. Hence there often will not be sufficient cues to settle for this reading. In contrast, the numeral in ‘John has a hundred thousand dollars’ is usually read as exhaustive. There is an exact parallel to the textbook example of scalar implicature:

(18) John has three children.

(18) is read as John has precisely three children, one explanation being a scalar implicature which triggers a pragmatic inference (Fox and Hackl 2006, 540). Whatever the correct explanation is, there is a strong cue against anaphoric binding.
I have set out to explore the cues against anaphoric binding, and how they can achieve what the threat of an outright inconsistency cannot achieve. The first thing to note is that the semantic inconsistency in itself is no sufficient cue against the anaphoric reading. We need additional cues. The prime cue which allows to avoid the anaphoric reading in a normal sequence like (1a)-(1b) is the mismatch between the description of worlds where p1 and the description of worlds where p1 & p2. The relevant worlds where p1 do not trivially satisfy the strenghening part p2 of the antecedent of (1b). Due to this mismatch and the threatening inconsistency, we settle for an initiator reading. 
Our initial observation was that the utterance of a reverse Sobel sequence like (1b)-(1a) tends to be infelicitous. The reverse sequence does not display the descriptive mismatch between the first and the second antecedent which triggers the initiator reading of the normal sequence. Although one may sometimes read the weaker antecedent as entailing the denial of the strenghening part (‘only the US’), when a reverse sequence is infelicitous, there is no sufficiently strong cue for such a reading. However, there are two principled kinds of cues which allow to avoid the anaphoric reading of a sequence of the reverse type, i.e. where the strengthened antecedent p1 & p2 comes first. The first kind of cue indicates that the (apparently) weaker antecedent p1 is to be read as excluding the strengthening part of the strengthened antecedent. It is to be read as p1 & not-p2. The prime example of such a cue is a standard exhaustivity reading (e.g. in virtue of scalar implicature) as in:

(16b) If John had a million dollars, he would buy a house;
(16a) if John had a hundred thousand dollars, he would move into a bigger apartment in the neighbourhood.

Here independently of the threat of a contradiction the numerals are read as exhaustive. John has a hundred thousand dollars and nothing else. 
The second type of case is one where the consequent of the subsequent conditional is read as explicitly denying the strengthening part of the antecedent, as in:

(6b) If Sophie had gone to the parade and not seen Pedro, she would have been upset.
(6a) But if Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro.

In this case, we get a sufficiently strong explicit cue against the anaphoric reading. Even donkey anaphora may lead to reading the consequent as explicitly denying the strengthening part of the antecedent, as in:

(15b) If John played violin, he would own a violin;
(15a) if John played an instrument, it would be piano.





In the final section, I shall take a closer look at the distinction between indicative and subjunctive conditionals. I shall present one exemplary way to spell out the anaphoric reading for indicative conditionals. I propose to treat indicative conditionals as incomplete descriptions of possible worlds. A conditionan if p, q talks about the maximally salient worlds in a Lewisian preorder. As contrasted to counterfactuals, the preorder is one of salience, and the worlds at stake are epistemically possible instead of metaphysically possible worlds. Take 

(2a) If the USA throws its weapons into the sea, there will be war; 
(2b) but if the USA and the other superpowers throw their weapons into the sea, there will be peace.

(2b) If the USA and the other superpowers throw their weapons into the sea, there will be peace; 
(2a) #but if the USA throws its weapons into the sea, there will be war.

There is a salience ordering of epistemic possibilities. When we interpret an utterance of (2a)-(2b) as true, we keep the most salient worlds where the US throws its weapons into the sea apart from the less salient worlds where all the superpowers do so.​[20]​ We take the (2a)-worlds not to satisfy the additional descriptive material the other superpowers throw their weapons into the sea and thus avoid the contradiction. When we interpret an utterance of (2b)-(2a), in contrast, the worlds where all superpowers throw their weapons into the sea as referred to in uttering (2b) are raised to uniquely maximal salience. And they satisfy the descriptive condition imposed on worlds where the US does so as referred to in uttering (2a). Hence they are uniquely relevant to evaluating (2a). The cues for anaphoric binding are so strong that the sequence becomes infelicitous.​[21]​
The proposal leads to some convincing predictions. Take again the contrast between

(4b) The pigs with floppy ears are not grunting; 
(4a´) #but the pigs are not those with floppy ears.

(5b) The closest Shell stations are great;
(5a´) but the closest gas stations are not Shell stations.

Only the latter sequence is felicitous because, in an initiator reading, an independent closeness ordering keeps the closest gas stations and the closest Shell stations apart. An analogous explanation accounts for the felicity of:

(6b) If Sophie had gone to the parade and not seen Pedro, she would have been upset.
(6a) But if Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro.
 
For this to be truly uttered, the closest worlds where Sophie goes to the parade and does not see Pedro, though raised to maximum salience, must be presupposed to be less close than the closest worlds where she goes and sees Pedro. Yet in an indicative conditional, there is no closeness ordering as distinguished from the salience ordering. As a consequence, the indicative conditional is predicted to behave like the infelicitous pig sequence (4b)-(4a´).
To show that, as predicted by my account, the indicative analogue sounds awkward, I use a past-directed version. It is more clearly distinguished from the subjunctive version than the present- or future-directed one (cf. DeRose 2010):

(19b) If Sophie went to the parade and did not see Pedro, she was upset;
(19a) #but if Sophie went to the parade, she saw Pedro.

The most salient worlds where Sophie goes to the parade and does not see Pedro form the only candidates for the most salient worlds where Sophie goes to the parade as referred to in uttering (19a). As in the pig examples, there is no way of evading the inconsistent reading. The salience mechanism leads to inconsistency.​[22]​ The indicative analogue of (15b)-(15a) also seems infelicitous:

(20b) If John played violin, he owned a violin;
(20a) #but if John played an instrument, it was piano.

The infelicity can be explained as in the case of (19b)-(19a).
However, there is a significant difference to:

(16b) If John had a million dollars, he would buy a house;
(16a) if John had a hundred thousand dollars, he would move into a bigger apartment in the neighbourhood.

The indicative analogue of this sequence is perfectly fine:

(21b) If John had a million dollars, he bought a house;
(21a) but if John had a hundred thousand dollars, he moved into a bigger apartment in the neighbourhood.

This is easily explained if the numeral is naturally read as follows: John had a hundred thousand dollars and not significantly more. The antecedents of the two conditionals cannot be matched.
Summarising: I have given a general theory of Sobel sequences in terms of anaphoric binding and presuppositional anaphora. The unifying perspective is that conditionals are descriptions of worlds. As a consequence, the anaphoric explanation why Sobel sequences are felicitous but their reversal normally is not can be transferred to them.​[23]​
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^1	 	Lewis credits J. Howard Sobel with bringing these sequences to his attention.
^2	 	 (i) I feel uncertain about inserting ‘but’. Often it sounds better, but some authors avoid it. (ii) I disregard the distinction between subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals.
^3	 	 Although the distinction between felicity and infelicity applies to utterances, I will sometimes loosely talk as if mere sentences were infelicitous.
^4	 	 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out the possibility that an utterance of (1b)-(1a) may be felicitous when the speaker successfully conveys the intention that (1a) be read as ‘only the US’.
^5	 	 Singular and plural definite descriptions, incomplete or not, presuppose that there is something to which they non-ambiguously refer (cf. von Heusinger 2006, 40). The difference is that singular descriptions come with a uniqueness presupposition.
^6	 	 This sequence was used by Kai von Fintel to make a different point. I stick to his plural version, although there is a perfectly analogous singular version.
^7	 	 There is a certain context-dependency: closeness is determined by spatial distance to some point of evaluation. But one could also vary the example (‘the cheapest’).
^8	 	 I assume that a 9+ earthquake is not ipso facto a 3 earthquake.
^9	 	 I do not see a scope ambiguity in (9b) as in ‘Bernard thinks that Sophie is shorter than she is’. ‘Actually’ tells us to keep fixed Sophie’s actual height in comparing it to a situation where Sophies height is different. 
^10	 	 In the simplified standard account, all antecedent worlds which are closest to the evaluation world have to be consequent worlds for a counterfactual to be true. For a might-counterfactual to be true, some closest antecedent worlds have to be consequent worlds. (9b) is used to claim that all closest worlds where Sophie goes to the parade and is shorter than 1.70m are worlds where she does not see Pedro. Moreover, (9b) is purported to raise to salience the epistemic possibility that some closest parade-going worlds are worlds where Sophie is shorter than 1.70m. Since these are among the closest worlds where Sophie goes to the parade and is shorter than 1.70m, from (9b) it follows that they are worlds where Sophie does not see Pedro. Thus, it is a salient epistemic possibility that some closest worlds where Sophie goes to the parade are worlds where she does not see Pedro (given epistemic possibility is closed under deduction). This epistemic possibility makes (9a*) infelicitous to utter, because with conjunction conditionalisation (9a*) entails that all closest parade-going worlds are worlds where Sophie does see Pedro.
^11	 	 As we will see, the answer will need certain qualifications.
^12	 	 There might be a felicitous reading of certain reverse sequences. For instance, a US citizen may say:	(23b) the president of Guatemala is in Washington; 	(23a) but the president [of the US] is in Camp David.	For some definite NP, there may be a particular referent which usually trumps any competitor in contextual salience.
^13	 	There is also a singular version, but I use the plural version to facilitate the comparison with (5b)-(5a´). 
^14	 	 This presupposes ‘salience spreading’: ‘…an expression not only changes the most-accessible element of the set introduced, but also that of some relevant supersets of this set.’(von Heusinger 2006, 45).
^15	 	 Uli Sauerland (in conversation) has suggested that the Sobel phenomenon may have to do with a contextual standard of granularity. I think some cases of non-maximality can be interpreted along these lines. For instance, sometimes the windows example (12a)-(12b) may be interpreted as a case where we start from a loose way of counting open windows: it does not make a difference whether all windows are open or whether all windows minus those in the living room are open. (12b) forces us to proceed to a more fine-grained way of counting where the distinction becomes relevant. However, I doubt that the pattern fits all cases of non-maximality.
^16	 	 Moreover, I have heard doubts that the P-600 effect is triggered by too many different things to support such a specific explanatory hypothesis.
^17	 	 Cf. Schlenker 2004, 438-442 on the conditions of using then.
^18	 	 It is tempting to consider a non-maximal reading (not all but a relevant proportion of closest antecedent worlds are consequent worlds), which parallels the non-maximal reading of the F are G. This possibility can be handled analogously to a non-maximal reading of the gas station sequence (5b)-(5a). The reverse sequence is infelicitous to utter because there are strong cues for binding the antecedent worlds where the US throws its weapons into the sea relevant to evaluating (5a) to the antecedent worlds relevant to evaluating (5b). These cues are not countervailed by cues to the contrary. Thus, even in a non-maximal reading, there are sufficiently strong cues that the worlds relevant to evaluating (5b) are not exceptions among the worlds relevant to evaluating (5a).
^19	 	 In a presentation at BW8 on Conditionals, Barcelona, June 26-28, 2013. I select those of Nichols’s examples which I take to be convincing.
^20	 	 If there is a non-maximal reading of conditionals, there is also the possibility that the (2b)-worlds form exceptions among the (2a)-worlds. Again non-maximal conditionals can be treated analogously to non-maximal descriptions.
^21	 	 Something akin to Williams’s (2008) analysis can be obtained as a special case: in this case, the ordering distinguishes just two degrees of salience, the more salient worlds forming part of the context set, and the less salient worlds not forming part of the context set.
^22	 	 Perhaps (19b)-(19a) does not sound quite as catastrophic as (3b)-(3a´). And if the second if is stressed, it is perfectly fine. This can be explained by the possibility of purposively ruling out epistemic possibilities. (19b)-(19a) can be used to express your absolute certainty that Sophie did see Pedro. You first grant the possibility that she did not and then withdraw your acceptance.
^23	  Acknowledgements to Amaia Garcia Odon, Manuel Križ, and Cory Nichols.
